The Canadian Army in Afghanistan was written immediately after the completion of Canadian Army combat operations in Afghanistan in July 2011. The close proximity of this history to the events depicted herein will undoubtedly raise questions relating to the nature of history, objective distance, and the personal involvement of the author in the conflict. My response is that history will always be a moving target subjected to the Rashomon Effect, and there will be constant ideological interpretation and reinterpretation of events and decisions given contemporary political pressures and other factors, many of them personal.
There are different types of history. This is only one of them. An overview cannot hope to capture every aspect of the conflict. To achieve that aim, a variety of works are required including personal memoirs, tactical narratives, and technical and organizational history. That said, The Canadian Army in Afghanistan is not intended to be the final word on the Army’s involvement in Afghanistan. By necessity, some things must be compressed because of space, time, and readability. Given the nature of the conflict as well as the classified and technical nature of many Canadian successes, and with many misconceptions extant in the public domain, it is crucial that an accurate chronology of events and an initial narrative be written to capture what happened, based on what is known now.
I fully expect that this depiction of the events that occurred between 2001 to 2011 will be challenged and fully expect successors to produce other works, in due course, with perhaps better information or through the creation of a new lens from which to view the same data. Someone, however, has to initiate that process so we can learn from the Canadian Army’s experiences. The dialogue and debates on the contents of these volumes must continue. The Canadian Army’s involvement in this conflict has many nuances that should not be lost over time or to expediency. There is a lot to learn, but only if we are able, as Canadians, to unflinchingly look the Afghanistan experience in the face and assess what was accomplished, what was not, and why. That was the task given to me by the Chief of the Land Staff, with the approval of the Chief of Defence Staff, in 2007.
Available for download here.